Abstract
Introduction
Reasoning about knowledge and common knowledge has been shown to be widely applicable in distributed computing, AI, and game theory. (See [2] for numerous examples.) Complete axioms for reasoning about knowledge and common knowledge are well known in the case of a fixed finite set of agents. However, in many applications, the set of agents is not known in advance and has no a priori upper bound (think of software agents on the web or nodes on the Internet, for example); it is often easiest to model the set of agents as an infinite set. And in some applications in game theory and economics (where reasoning about knowledge and common knowledge is quite standard; see, for example, [1, 4] ) economies are often modeled as consisting of infinitely many (even uncountably many) agents. For example, when analyzing a game played with two teams, we may well want to say that everyone on team 1 knows that Supported in part by NSF under grant IRI-96-25901. everyone on team 2 knows some fact p, or that it is common knowledge among the agents on team 1 that p is common knowledge among the agents on team 2. We would want to say this even if the teams consist of infinitely many agents.
The logics for reasoning about the knowledge of groups of agents contain modal operators K i (where K i ' is read "agent i knows '"), E G (where E G ' is read "everyone in group G knows '"), and C G (where C G ' is read "' is common knowledge among group G"). The operators E G and C G make perfect sense even if we allow the sets G to be infinite-their semantic definitions remain unchanged. If the set of agents is finite, so that, in particular, G is finite, there is a simple axiom connecting E G ' to K i ', namely, E G ' ,^i 2G K i '. Once we allow infinite groups G of agents, there is no obvious analogue for this axiom. Nevertheless, in this paper, we show that there exist natural sound and complete axiomatizations for reasoning about knowledge and common knowledge even if there are infinitely many agents. It is also well known that if there are finitely many agents, then there is a decision procedure that decides if a formula ' is satisfiable (or valid) that runs in time exponential in j'j, where ' is the length of the formula viewed as a string of symbols. We prove a similar result for a language with infinitely many agents. However, two issues arise (that, in fact, are also relevant even if there are only finitely many agents, although they have not been considered before):
1. In the statement of the complexity result in [2] , E G and C G are both viewed as having length 2 + 2jGj (where jGj is the cardinality of G). Clearly we cannot use this definition here if we want to get interesting complexity results, since jGj may be infinite. Even if we restrict our attention to finite sets G, we would like a decision procedure that treats these sets in a uniform way, independently of their cardinality.
Here we view E G as having length 1 and C G as having length 3, independent of the cardinality of G. (See, for example, the proof of Proposition 3.5 for the role of independence and the definition of S u b ' in the proof of Theorem 4.5 for an indication as to why C G has length 3 rather than 1.) Even with this definition of length, we prove that the complexity of the satisfiability problem is still essentially exponential time. ( We discuss below what "essentially" means.) Thus our results improve previously-known results even if there are only finitely many agents. 2. In the earlier proofs, it is implicitly presumed that the sets G are presented in such a way that there is no difficulty in testing membership in G. As we show here, in order to decide if certain formulas are satisfiable, we need to be able to test if certain subsets of agents of the form G 0 , G 1 : : : G k are empty, where G 0 ; : : : ; G k are sets of agents.
In fact, if we are interested in a notion of knowledge that satisfies positive introspection-that is, if agent i knows ', then she knows that she knows it-then we also need to check whether such subsets are singletons. And if we are interested in a notion of knowledge that satisfies negative introspection-that is, if agent i does not know ', then she knows that she does not know it-then we may also need to check whether such subsets have cardinality m, for certain finite m. The difficulty of deciding these questions depends in part on how G 0 ; : : : ; G k are presented and which sets of agents we can talk about in the language. For example, if G 0 ; : : : ; G k are recursive sets, deciding if G 0 , G 1 : : : G k is nonempty may not even be recursive. Here, we provide a decision procedure for satisfiability that runs in time exponential in j'j provided that we have oracles for testing appropriate properties of sets of the form G 0 ,G 1 : : : G k . Moreover, we show that any decision procedure must be able to answer the questions we ask. In the full paper, we prove a stronger result, providing a tight bound on the complexity of deciding satisfiability that takes into account the complexity of answering questions about the cardinality of G 0 , G 1 : : : G k .
Again, this issue is of significance even if there are only finitely many agents. For example, in the SDSI approach to security [8] , there are names, which can be viewed as representing sets of agents. SDSI provides a (nondeterministic) algorithm for computing the set of agents represented by a name. If we want to make statements such as "every agent represented by name n knows '" (statements that we believe will be useful in reasoning about security [5, 6] ) then the results of this paper show that to decide validity in the resulting logic, we need more than just an algorithm for resolving the agents represented by a given name. We also need algorithms for resolving which agents are represented by one name and not another. More generally, if we assume that we have a separate language for representing sets of agents, our results characterize the properties of sets that we need to be able to decide in order to reason about the group knowledge of these agents.
In the next section, we briefly review the syntax and semantics of the logic of common knowledge. In Section 3 we state the main results and prove them under some simplifying assumptions that allow us to bring out the main ideas of the proof. We drop these assumptions in Section 4, where we provide some of the details of the proofs of the main results (the remainder can be found in the full paper).
Syntax and Semantics: A Brief Review
Syntax: We start with a (possibly infinite) set A of agents. Let G be a set of nonempty subsets of A. (Note that we do not require G to be closed under union, intersection, or complementation; it can be an arbitrary collection of subsets.) We get the language L C G Φ by starting with a set Φ of primitive propositions, and closing under^, :, and the modal operators K i , for i 2 A, and E G ; C G , for G 2 G. Thus, if p; q 2 Φ, i 2 A, and G; G 0 2 G, then
We read K i ' as "agent i knows '", E G ' as "everyone in group G knows '", and C G ' as "' is common knowledge among the agents in G".
Let L E G be the sublanguage of L C G that does not include the C G operators. Let j'j be the length of the formula viewed as a string of symbols, where the modal operators K i and E G are counted as having length 1 and C G is counted as having length 3 (even if G is an infinite set of agents) and all primitive propositions are counted as having length 1.
In [2, 7] , A is taken to be the set f1; : : : ; n g; in [7] , G is taken to be the singleton ff1; : : : ; n gg (so that we can only talk about every agent in A knowing ' and common knowledge among the agents in A), while in [2] , G is taken to consist of all nonempty subsets of A. 
Semantics

Axioms:
The following are the standard axioms and rules that have been considered for knowledge.
Prop. All substitution instances of tautologies of propositional calculus. 
K1.
We will be interested in the following axioms and rule for reasoning about everyone knows:
If A is finite (so that all the sets in G are finite) we can simplify E1 and E2 to
It is easy to see that E follows from E1 and E2 (in the presence of Prop and MP) and every instance of E1 and E2 follows from E if A is finite. E is used instead of E1 and E2 in [2, 7] . Note that E2 is recursive iff deciding if G , A 0 G 0 = ; is recursive. (We determine precisely which such questions we must be able to answer in Proposition 3.3.) E3 and EGen are the obvious analogues of K1 and KGen for E G . We do not need them in the case that A is finite; it is easy to see that they follow from K1, KGen, and E. In the case that A is infinite, however, they are necessary.
is easy to see that E4 follows from K2, E1, and EGen, so will not be needed in systems that contain these axioms. Moreover, it is not hard to show that E4 follows from E1, E2, and K5 if the set of agents is finite. However, it does not follow from these axioms if the set of agents is infinite. Axiom E5 follows from K2 and E1. Moreover, we use it only in systems that already include K2 and E1. Nevertheless, for technical reasons, it is useful to list it separately.
Axiom E6 (with E G replaced by K i ) is the standard axiom used to characterize symmetric K i relations [2] . It follows easily from K2, K5, E1, and E2 if A is finite. However, like E4, it must be specifically included if A is infinite.
Finally, we have the following well-known axiom and inference rule for common knowledge:
Historically, in the case of one agent, the system with axioms and rules Prop, K1, MP, and KGen has been called K; adding K2 to K gives us T; adding K4 to T gives us S4; adding K5 to S4 gives us S5; replacing K2 by K3 in S5
gives us KD45. We use the subscript G to emphasize the fact that we are considering systems with sets of agents coming from G rather than only one agent and the superscript C to emphasize that we add E1-E3, EGen, C1, and RC1 to the system. In this way, we get the systems K C G , T C G , and
E3, EGen, C1, and RC1; we get S4 C G by adding K2 and K4
to K C G . We get KD45 C G by adding K3-K5 and E4 to K C G and we get S5 C G by adding K2, K4, K5 and E6 to K C G .
One of the two main results of this paper shows that each of these axiom systems is sound and complete with respect to an appropriate class of structures. For example, K C G is a sound and complete axiomatization with respect to M A and S5 C G is a sound and complete axiomatization with respect to M rst A . In the case that A is finite, this result is well known (see [2, 7] -as mentioned earlier, E is used in the axiomatization instead of E1-E3 and EGen). What is perhaps surprising is that E1-E3 and EGen suffice even if A is infinite. For example, suppose G just consists of the singleton A. In that case, E2 becomes vacuous. Thus, while the axioms force E A ' to imply that each agent in A knows ', we have no way of expressing the converse. Indeed, as we show in the full paper, it is easy to construct a structure for the axioms with the standard interpretations of all the K i relations but a nonstandard one of E A , where all the agents in A know ' and yet E A ' does not hold.
The Main Results and a Proof in a Simplified Setting
In this section, we state the two main results of this paper-complete axiomatizations and decision procedures. We then provide a proof of a simpler version of these results that illustrates some of the main ideas. We first state the completeness results. where we assume that the sets of primitive propositions that appear in ' Gj;pj , j = k 0 + 1; : : : ; k , are mutually exclusive and do not include p.
Finally, define G to be ' G;p^EG 0q^:p ' G;q , where we assume that the primitive propositions that appear in ' G;p and ' G;q are disjoint. In the full paper, we show that ' G;p and G have the required properties. This clearly suffices to prove (b).
The proof of part (c) is similar in spirit to that of (b); we leave the details to the full paper. We leave it to the reader to check that ' d is satisfiable in
We already saw that for axiom E2 to be recursive,we need to be able to decide whether jG 0 ,G 1 : : : G k j 1 (or, equivalently, whether G 0 G 1 : : : G k ) for G 0 ; : : : ; G k 2 G A . Proposition 3.3 shows that if there is no recursive algorithm for answering such questions, the satisfiability problem for the logic (even without C G operators) is also not decidable. For simplicity here, we assume we have oracles that can answer the questions that we need to answer (according to Proposition 3.3) in unit time; we consider the complexity of querying the oracle in more detail in the full paper. More precisely, let O m be an oracle that, for a set For the other direction, suppose M 0 ; s j = ' for some structure M 0 over A 0 . We define a structure M over A by defining K i = K i . Again an easy induction shows that for every formula with sets chosen from G ' , M 0 ; s j = if and only if M ;s j = . Once again, the only point to notice is that E G (and so also C G ) has the same meaning in M 0 (in terms of reachability) as E G (C G ) in M by the definition of G and the relations K j . Thus M ;s j = ' as required.
Corollary 3.6 : Given an oracle that decides, for each
Boolean combination G of elements in G A , whether G = ;, there is an algorithm that decides whether a formula ' 2 L C G is satisfiable in M A that runs in time 2 c2 j'j for some c 0.
Proof: Clearly, to check if ' is satisfiable, it suffices to check if ' is satisfiable. In [7] , there is an exponential time algorithm for checking satisfiability. However, this algorithm presumes that the set of agents is fixed. A close look at the algorithm actually shows that it runs in time 2 cmj'j , where m is the number of agents. In our translation, the set of agents is exponential in j'j, giving us a doubleexponential time algorithm. While Corollaries 3.6 and 3.7 are close to our desired theorems, they also make clear the difficulties we need to overcome in order to prove Theorems 3.1 and 3.4. Specifically, we need to cut the complexity down from doubleexponential to single exponential; we need to prove completeness without assuming that G is closed under complementation and intersection; we want to use an oracle that tests only whether a set of the form G 0 ,G 1 : : : G k is nonempty, rather than one that applies to arbitrary Boolean combinations; we want to extend these results to the case that the K i relations satisfy properties like transitivity.
With regard to the last point, while in general it is relatively straightforward to extend completeness and complexity results to deal with relations that have properties like transitivity, it is not so straightforward in this case. For example, even if M 2 M rt A , the relations in the structure M constructed in Proposition 3.5 are not necessarily transitive. As shown in Proposition 3.3, we need a different oracle to deal with transitivity.
Proving the Main Results
In this section, we sketch the proof of A to the full paper. The structure of the proof is similar to that of Corollaries 3.6 and 3.7; we describe step by step the modifications required to deal with the problems raised in the previous section.
The Proof for M A and M r A
In Proposition 3.5 we showed that we could translate a formula ' to a formula ' such that ' was satisfiable in M A iff ' was satisfiable in M A 0, where A 0 consisted of the atoms over G ' . Our goal is to maintain the translation idea, but use as our target set of agents a set whose elements we can determine with the oracles at our disposal (for testing the nonemptiness of certain set differences). As a first step, we try to abstract the key ingredients of Proposition 3.5.
Suppose we have a set A 0 of agents and a partial map : A ! A 0 . Again, we can extend to a map from 2 A to 2 A 0 : G = f i : i 2 G g . Given a formula ', let ' be the formula that results by replacing all the occurrences of G in ' by G. In Proposition 3.5, A 0 is the set of atoms over G ' and i is the unique atom containing i. We were able to show that, for that choice of A 0 and , the formulas ' and ' were equisatisfiable. What does it take to obtain such a result in general? The following result shows that we need to be able to find a mapping : A 0 ! 2 A , f;g with one key property.
Proposition 4.1: Given a formula ' and a partial map
: A ! A 0 such that G 6 = ; for all G 2 G ' , suppose that there is a mapping : A 0 ! 2 A , f;g such that for all
Proof: Left to the full paper.
For the mapping of Proposition 3.5 we can take to be the identity, but this requires an oracle for nonemptiness of atoms. We now show how to choose A 0 and define maps and in a way that requires only information about whether sets of the form G 0 , G 1 : : : G k are empty. Given a set G of sets of agents and G 2 G , a  set H G is a G-maximal subset of G if G , H 6 = ; and G , H G 0 = ; for all G 0 2 G , H . Let RG = fG; HjG 2 G ; H is a G-maximal subset of Gg .
Definition 4.2:
Note that we can check whether H is a G-maximal subset of G by doing at most jGj tests of the form G , H 0 = ;, and we can find all pairs G; H in RG ' by doing at most jGj2 jGj,1 such tests. We now show how to define a translation satisfying the hypotheses of Proposition 4.1 using the elements of RG ' identified according to the second coordinate alone.
Given a formula ', let A ' = fH : 9G G; H 2 RG ' g. Define 1 : A ! A ' by setting 1 i = H if i 2 A H (as defined after Lemma 4.3) and undefined otherwise. As before, we extend 1 to 2 A by defining
Since jAj 2 j'j , we have now reduced satisfiability with infinitely many agents to satisfiability with finitely many agents, at least for M A and M r A , using only tests that we know we will need to be able to perform in any case. We next must deal with the problem we observed in the proof of Corollary 3.6, that is, there may be exponentially many agents in the subgroups mentioned in '
1 . This is done in the following result. In this result, we assume that the complexity of checking whether i 2 G is no worse than linear in jAj. While we do not assume this in general, it is true for the A 0 and sets G that arise in the translation of Proposition 4.1, which suffices for our application of the result to the proof of Theorem 3.4. Since S j S j+1 , S 1 has at most 2 j'j elements, and there are jAj relations, it is easy to see that the whole procedure can be carried out in time OjAj2 cj'j for some c 0.
Theorem 4.5:
It remains to show that the algorithm is correct. The ideas are relatively straightforward and left to the full paper. For the upper bound, suppose we are given a formula '.
We first compute the set RG ' . This can be done with at most j'j2 j'j calls to oracle O 0 , since jG ' j j'j and we need only check, for each G 2 G ' and H G ' , whether G , H = ;. 1 has size at most 2 j'j ).
We now want to prove .) The problem with this is that there is no guarantee that the resulting set is in G. Alternatively, we could replace K H by K i for some i such that 1 i = H.
But if so, which one?
We actually take the latter course here. We solve the problem of which i to choose by showing that there is a proof of '
1 in which the only modal operators that arise in any formula used in the proof are modal operators that appear in ' 1 (Lemma 4.7). For these operators, there is a canonical way to do the replacement (Lemma 4.6). While it may seem almost trivial that the only operators that should be needed in the proof of ' 1 are ones that already appear in the formula, this is not the case for the standard completeness proof [2, 7] , since in the proof of the validity of a formula of the form E G , the modal operators K i are used for i 2 G, although these operators may not appear in . It is important that we use the axioms E1 and E2 in doing the proof, rather than the axiom E; otherwise the result would not hold. Indeed, the result does not quite hold in the case of T C G ; we need to augment it with E5. While this general approach to proving completeness is quite standard, we must take extra care because of our insistence on restricting to symbols that appear in ', particularly when dealing with the case when a state seems inconsistent due to a formula of the form :E G or :C G not being satisfied. This is where the axioms E1 and E2 come into play. We leave details to the full paper. 
